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COUNTRIES1 
 
Aleksandra BRADIĆ-MARTINOVIĆ2  
 
 
Abstract 
 
The payment systems have significant role in each economy. Large-value payment 
systems (LVPS) are essential part of financial market and represent its 
infrastructure. In this paper we tried to determine the impact of systemic risk in 
their functionality using the analysis of indicators for measuring the level of its 
development. As a basis for analysis we used methodology developed by Cirasino 
and Garcia (2008), representatives of Payment Systems Development Group 
(World Bank). In the first part each segment of LVPS indicator is analysed in 
order to establish connection between systemic risks and the level of LVPS 
development. The second part of paper contains empirical research for Serbia, 
Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia and Slovenia, 
because their payment systems share the same heritage. Cirasino and Garcia 
published their ranks, but we did detailed calculation within all criteria. This 
calculation provided deeper insight in the risk management of those countries. At 
the end of the paper the conclusion is given that there is a high dependence 
between LVPS development and systemic risk management. We also conclude that 
WB countries and Slovenia has solid systemic risk management in their LVPS. 
Key words: payment systems, LVPS, systemic risk management, WB countries 
INTRODUCTION 
Payment system is one of the key elements of financial sector and indirectly of 
the real economy. Humphrey (1995) highlights the necessity for each country to 
                                                   
1 This paper is a part of research projects numbers 47009 (European integrations and 
social and economic changes in Serbian economy on the way to the EU) and 179015 
(Challenges and prospects of structural changes in Serbia: Strategic directions for 
economic development and harmonization with EU requirements), financed by the 
Ministry of Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia.. 
2 Aleksandra Bradić-Martinović, Institute of Economic Sciences Belgrade, Associate 
researcher 
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implement continuous improvement of the national payment system, as provided 
by progress of banking system, money market and economy.  
 
Safe and efficient payment system has high importance in the development of 
economy, especially from the perspective of monetary policy and financial 
stability. In most countries central banks are LVSP providers and they monitor 
developments in the payment system in order to assess its impact on the demand 
for money, the influence of monetary policy transactions and the efficiency and 
stability of critically related financial markets (BIS-CPSS, 2006). Cirassino 
(2007) claims that the safe system is the key element for maintaining and 
promoting financial stability. The problems may arise if the system has poor 
design or technical and operational failures, because that condition can be 
generator for contagion and severe systemic disruptions in financial markets. 
Bech et al (2008) realize that the scope of problems is even more complex as a 
result of rapid technological changes and evolution of users needs (e-payments, 
m-payments). Those processes cause significant transformation of the payment 
systems infrastructure, procedures and risks. Central banks have become aware of 
these trends and they have taken an active role in payment systems development 
in last few decades, with the objective to provide solid base for overall financial 
system development.  
 
Cirasino (2007) point out that payment systems have moved from the backroom 
to the boardroom of all financial institutions due to the recognition of the critical 
role which a solid functioning payment system plays in supporting the financial 
and real economies. From a broader perspective, a less than optimal use of 
payment instruments and/or inefficient or poorly designed systems to process 
these instruments may ultimately have an impact on systemic stability, economic 
development and growth. 
 
Central part of each national payment systems is one or few (in highly developed 
countries) LVPS systems. This type of systems are mainly used for interbank 
payment instructions, which include settlement of interbank money market 
operations, the cash leg of securities trades and leg of foreign exchange trades. 
Large-value payment systems typically process a relatively small number of high-
value and time-critical payments (ECB, www.ecb.int). The appearance of disorder 
in this area of economic infrastructure may have devastating consequences.  The 
biggest problem of these systems relates to the possibility of generating and 
transmitting systemic disorders in a very short time (within one working day). 
Because of that, the development of real time gross settlement (RTGS) systems is 
response to the growing awareness of the need for sound risk management in 
large-value funds transfer systems. RTGS systems can offer a powerful 
mechanism for limiting settlement and systemic risks in the interbank settlement 
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process because they can effect final settlement of individual funds transfers on a 
continuous basis during the processing day. In addition, an RTGS system can 
contribute to the reduction of settlement risk in securities and foreign exchange 
transactions by facilitating the delivery versus payment (DVP) and payment 
versus payment mechanisms (World Bank, 2008). 
 
In her speech, Tumpel-Gugerell (2010) pointed out that analysis conducted after 
the crisis showed that payment and settlement systems have functioned well 
during the recent crisis and have contributed to prevent worse outcomes, 
continuous work on further strengthening and harmonizing payment and 
settlement systems will enhance the resilience of the financial system. More 
harmonized and integrated payment and settlement systems increase the 
efficiency of financial markets and ultimately lead to cost savings and welfare 
gains for the overall economy, these efficiency gains will free up more liquidity 
and capital for the financial industry.  
 
Total disruptions of payments systems are extremely rare events, so we do not 
have much historical data on how payment systems react to a disruption. As we 
already stated even in the recent financial crisis the payment systems have 
functioned without serious disruptions. One of the most well known operational 
disruptions in the interbank payment system is the attacks on the world trade 
centre in New York on September 11, 2001. The massive damage on property and 
communication systems made it more difficult or even impossible for some banks 
to execute payments to other banks. The impact of such a disruption can have 
effects beyond the immediate counter parties of the banks disrupted by the shock. 
In extreme cases it might even disrupt the whole financial system (Heijmans, 
2009). 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
Risk is a phenomenon present in each area of business and also is characterized 
by the operations of payment systems. In general, no matters of the cause, 
payment system’s risks are consequence of inability to complete the initiated 
payment transaction, i.e. to reach the state of finality (Kahn and Roberds, 1998). 
Seemingly technical problem can have far-reaching effects on payment system 
functioning, but in extreme situation on the whole economy.  
 
Scmitz and Puhr (2009) and Khandelwar (2007) share the state that the payment 
systems risks are directly determined by the participants, type of settlement 
systems, technology in use and the role of providers. The level of risk is 
additionally amplified by the security market transactions, because of their 
influence in global volume of transactions.  
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Introduction of information and communication technology is a basis of 
significant changes in the way of payment systems functioning. As a result of that 
process some risks reduced, the other modified, but some new risks arise, as well. 
The crucial invention which caused general reduction of risks level was 
introducing of RTGS systems. The main feature of this type of systems is that 
they can process payment transactions in real time and decrease the overall level 
of risks.  
 
The payment systems risks can be divided into credit risk, unwinding risk, 
liquidity risk and operational risk. The group which comprises credit, liquidity 
and unwinding risks is known as settlement risk group (Dale, 1998). All presented 
risks have one common feature, they can trigger systemic disturbance. The initial 
disturbance itself can e.g. be severe liquidity problems or insolvency of bank and 
its cases varied. The initial problem may become systemic when it transfers to 
other participants of the payment system, or even of the financial system (Galos 
and Soramaki, 2005). 
 
Other participants of the financial system may suffer the initial disturbance which 
then becomes systemic (a systemic event). A systemic event may decrease the 
confidence in participants of the financial sector and thus result in "investor 
panics" when creditors withdraw their claims. A systemic event may appear as 
credit losses and/or liquidity problems and may cause other banks to become 
insolvent or illiquid. A disturbance of systemic nature may affect the performance 
of the financial markets which may become weak due to that and eventually 
negatively affect the economy as a whole (De Bandt and Hartmann, 2000). 
 
Credit risk is the risk of loss as a consequence of a participant’s inability to meet 
its payment obligation. The credit risk can arise between the moment when 
payment transaction entered in the system and the moment of execution. Galos 
and Soramaki (2005) observe that RTGS system provides instant finality 
throughout the business day and reduce the risk that settlement will not occur. 
DNS system settles the account at the end of the day, so the probability of credit 
risk failure is much higher. That is the main reason why most of the countries 
decide to upgrade their national payment system, implementing the RTGS 
solution.  
 
Unwinding risk is another settlement risk and it arises because the payment 
instruction released to receivers may be revoked, or unwound. Unwinding risk is 
characteristic only for DNS systems, in the situation of settlement errors, because 
it is not technically possible in RTGS systems. Compare to credit risk, unwinding 
risk is very difficult to measure, and even more difficult to manage. Management 
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of this type of risk must include group agreement, which provide that each 
participant in the system have insight in credit ability of other participants.  
 
Liquidity risk is participant’s inability to carry the payment obligation or more of 
them, in time, due to cash flow short fall or insufficient funds. Liquidity in the 
moment of settlement is crucial for payment system and its participants. 
Khandelwal (2007) implies that the bank can have solid financial condition, but 
be unable to fulfil its obligation because of system failure. The liquidity risk is 
more typical for RTGS systems. In that type of system the participant need more 
funds for settlement during the whole business day. As an example of liquidity 
risk we can observe the situation explained in Financial Stability Paper (Bank of 
England, 2009). They point out events that have crystallised in recent years in UK 
payment systems. “On 15 September 2008, Lehman Brothers was places in 
administration. Lehman Brother’s default occurred after some intraday funding 
via the self-collateralising repo mechanism had been undertaken by CREST 
settlement banks. This demonstrates the importance of settlement banks ensuring 
adequate liquidity management planning for client default”. 
  
The liquidity risk can be minimize or even eliminate, in the system where all 
participants hold enough fund in transactional account. Fund can be cash or 
reserve, but the essential is that they can be used for settlement. The main 
problem is that holding funds in transactional account is expensive for banks, 
because these funds do not bring income. If we observe this problem form the 
banks’ focus, the costs of total risk elimination is too high. Jinesku (2006) pointed 
out that in RTGS systems each participant is exposed to the risk from any other 
participant. Illiquidity of one participant can cause the illiquidity of other, who 
counts for that fund as a guarantee of liquidity of its own. Unlike the RTGS 
system, where liquidity risk can arise during the whole business day, in DNS 
system it can happened only in the settlement cycle (one or more, per the day).  
 
The specific source of settlement risk can be found in cross-border transactions, 
which connect several payment systems in different countries, currencies and time 
zones. Additional problem is that those transactions are large value. In literature 
(Shirreff, 1996) the most known example of credit cross-border risk is Herstatt 
event, when Bankhaus Herstatt in Cologne was shut down by the German banking 
supervisors, in 1974. The closure, at 3.30 pm German time, left all of Herstatt's 
dollar foreign exchange transactions half completed in New York, where it was 
still only 10.30 am. The panic caused, even by that small number of failed 
payments, resulted in dislocation and gridlock in the foreign exchange markets. 
Eisenbeis (1997) points out more recent example from 1991, when the Bank of 
Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) has been closed. The Industrial Bank 
of Japan had paid 44 billion yen into BCCI's branch in Tokyo, for which payment 
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was to be received in New York from BCCI's New York branch. When BCCI was 
closed, the dollar portion of the transaction was never completed, and Industrial 
Bank of Japan became a creditor for $30 million. The name of that risk is herstatt 
risk.  
 
Operational risk arises as potential outcomes of operational events. Norman et al. 
(2009) provide an explanation of operational events, which are consists of: human 
aspect (errors as a result of insufficient experience, non-compliance procedures 
and policies, and fraud affinity), technical aspect (errors in the model of 
transaction processing or lack of appropriate instruments for risk measurement), 
process management aspect (lack of adequate report, monitoring and decision 
procedures. poor data processing and bad process control), and information 
technology aspect (it is connected with imperfection of information systems that 
are not identified in time). We can find lot of examples for operational risks 
events, but we will point the case of “double failure of the firewalls surrounding 
the RTGS processor on 7 July 2008 in UK payment system. When the main 
firewall at the secondary site, from where RTGS was running at the time, was 
unable to start due to a power failure, the backup firewall should have taken over, 
but it was unable to do so. This was subsequently found to be due to a lack of 
synchronisation between the two firewalls. On the day, the procedures for ‘failing 
over’ RTGS to the primary site, where the firewalls were operating correctly, 
worked well, but RTGS was unavailable in total for over 200 minutes” (Bank of 
England, 2008). 
 
Today one of the main goals of most system provider (i.e. central banks) is to 
minimize systemic risks. For settlement risks they obtain risks reduction by 
increasing the liquidity held by the participants in the system. Most countries have 
implemented the RTGS system in their large value payment systems aimed at 
reduction of systemic risk. RTGS systems significantly decrease the level of 
settlement risks, despite the high price for keeping the liquidity reserves. Dhumale 
(1999) observes that current design issues in RTGS systems vary by different 
countries but two aspects which are commonly discussed for better risk 
management are policies for central banks granting intraday credit and 
establishing queuing systems. Intraday credits transfer credit risk from 
participants to the central bank, but the best situation is when high quality 
collateral is required. The other solution is that the source or liquidity is opening 
balances and funds received from other participants during the day, or their 
reserve requirements during the day, or credit lines between banks. The additional 
solution for risk reduction is payment order which goes into a queue for later 
processing.  
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McPhail (2003) suggest that in the case of operational risk most popular solution 
for risk reduction is outsource. But, when it is concerned of central bank’s LVPS, 
that is not an option, because they are essential part of the financial infrastructure 
and are often unique. The other solution is risk control. For human error central 
bank must provide internal controls, for data and ICT infrastructure provider must 
have routine procedures for periodical data back-ups, tapes and other storage 
media which are kept in sites other than the main processing site, back-up servers 
which are deployed at the main processing site, a fully equipped alternate 
processing site, documented a formal business continuity plan which include 
procedures for crisis management and information dissemination, regularly tested.  
 
After establishing the relationship between financial market, payment systems 
and systemic risks in those systems, we can set the core hypothesis that the 
appropriate approach to risk management is necessary to achieve a high degree of 
LVPS development. 
 
Institutional reaction in the field of payment systems risk is included in the 
document published by Bank for International Settlement (BIS) entitled Core 
Principles for Systematically Important Payment Systems (Core Principles for 
SIPS). The Core Principles are intended for use as universal guidelines to 
encourage the design and operation of safer and more efficient SIPS worldwide 
(BIS, 2001). They present public policy objectives, safe and efficiency in SIPS.  
Based on Core Principles for SIPS, Cirasino and Garcia (2003) developed an 
indicator for measuring the LVPS level of development. They used Core 
Principles as a list of criteria that must be fulfilling by the LVPS. In the next part 
of this paper we will describe the structure of LVPS indicator in purpose to 
explore in which extent the risk reduction is important determinant of 
development level.  
 
Based on the World Bank’s Global Payment Systems Survey 2008, the document 
“Measuring Payment Systems Development” presents a measurement 
methodology and related outcomes for four areas of the national payments 
system: i) Legal and Regulatory Framework; ii) Large-Value Funds Transfer 
Systems; iii) Retail Payment Systems; and, iv) Payment system Oversight 
Function and Cooperation. 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The scoring for LVPS is based on system design and key policy decisions that 
affect the safety, soundness and efficiency of the system. For RTGS systems, the 
Core Principles that are scored in explicit form are CP III, CP VII, CP VIII, CP 
IX and CP X (Cirasino and Garcia, 2003). 
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First component of indicator measure the liquidity risk, which is cover with the 
questions about main sources of liquidity during the day, mechanism which is 
apply in the case of insufficient balance on participant’s account, and the pricing 
policy. Pricing policy is important because it is better to send payment 
instructions earlier in the morning, to avoid potential problems at the end of the 
business day, or before closing hour. The questions about liquidity risks are: 
LIQUIDITY RISKS 
1. What are the main sources of liquidity during the day? 
 
a. Opening balances and funds received from other participants during the day 
b. Participants can use a part of their reserve requirements during the day 
c. Participants can use all their reserve requirements balance during the day 
d. Lines of credit between banks
e. The RTGS operator allows current account overdrafts
f. The RTGS operator grants credit, either in the form of a loan or a repo 
g. Other 
 
Scoring: 
 
If answers b) or c) and e) or f) then give a 3 
If answers b) or c) or e) or f) only then give a 1.5 
If answer d) combined with either b), c), e) or f) then give a 1.5 
Otherwise then give a 0 
 
2. If a participant does not have enough balance (and/or credit) in its 
current account with the RTGS operator to process new payments, what 
mechanism becomes applicable? 
 
a. The payment order is rejected immediately 
b. The payment order goes into a queue for later processing 
 
Scoring: 
 
If answer b)  then give a 1.5 
Otherwise then give a 0 
 
3. Is the pricing policy used to incentivate the smooth flow of payments 
through the system during the day e.g. with differentiated charges based 
on the time of the day in which payment orders are processed, to promote 
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participants begin sending their orders early in the operational day? 
(indicate YES or NO)  
 
Scoring 
 
If YES  then give a 1.5 
If NO then give a 0 
 
Additional question is about credit risk, but that question is applicable in the case 
when the RTGS operator allows current account overdrafts or grants credit. 
Otherwise, there is no need to answer question 2.1. But if operator allows 
liquidity extension, it is very important to provide proper collateral mechanism. 
CREDIT RISKS FOR OPERATOR/INTRADAY LIQUIDITY 
PROVIDER 
4. How does the RTGS operator manage the credit risk that may arise as a 
result of applying some of the mechanisms discussed in the previous 
question? 
 
a. High quality collateral is required in all cases 
b. Collateral is required in all cases, but collateral does not always have suitable quality 
c. Current account overdrafts/credit is limited, but no collateralization is required  
d. There are no limits or collateralization requirements for account overdrafts/ credit 
Note: this is necessarily linked to item 1.1 under Liquidity Risks (answers e) and f)). 
Therefore, scoring system here uses subtraction mechanism, and combination of 1.1 and 
2.1 cannot be negative. 
 
Scoring 
 
If answer a)  then give 0 
If answer b) or c) then give a -1.5 (subtract) 
If answer d) then give -3 (subtract) 
 
Very important group of questions cover the main source of operational risks, ITC 
infrastructure failures. Those questions indicate the most important procedures 
and equipment which are necessary for safe functioning of LVPS. 
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RESILIENCE AND BUSINESS CONTINUITY 
5. Resilience and Business Continuity 
 
a. Routine procedures are in place for periodical data back-ups 
b. Tapes and other storage media are kept in sites other than the main processing site  
c. Back-up servers have been deployed at the main processing site
d. A fully equipped alternate processing site exists
e. The RTGS operator has documented a formal business continuity plan  
f. Business continuity arrangements include procedures for crisis management and information dissemination  
g. Business continuity arrangements are regularly tested 
 
Scoring: 
 
If all of the above, or all exept c) 6
If answers d) through g) 6
If all of the above, except d) 4
If answers a) through  e), even without c) 4
If answers a)through c)and e) 3
If answers d)and e) 3
If answers a)through c) 2
If only a) and b) or none 0
 
Efficiency of the payment process and in this case in connection with Central 
Security Depository systems is directly related with the risk. Less time for 
transaction execution, it is less likely the adverse event to happen.  
EFFICIENCY – Integration of the RTGS with other key settlement 
systems 
6. Central Bank-operated securities registry or CSD – The CSD has a real-
time interface with the RTGS (if applicable)? (indicate YES or NO) 
 
Scoring: 
 
If YES to any of the two questions above 2
Oherwise 0
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Safety and protection of the payment system depends of reliability of its 
participants and they are usually credit institutions. The Payment Services 
Directive (PSD, 2007/64/EC) is a regulatory document in EU which regulate 
payment systems, services and participants (providers), with objective (among 
others) to increase pan-European competition allowing non-banks to be a 
providers in payment systems. In new circumstances it is very important to 
provide rigid access rules and policies. Otherwise, the payment system can be 
very vulnerable and exposed to settlement risk.  
ACCESS RULES AND POLICIES 
7. RTGS access rules and policies. 
 
a. There is an explicit access/exclusion policy for the RTGS system  
b. 
Access to the RTGS is granted on the basis of institutional standing (i.e. 
whether the applicant is a bank, or some other specific type of financial 
institution  
c. 
Access to the RTGS is granted on the basis of the fulfillment of a set of 
objective criteria to ensure a safe and sound operation of the system (e.g. 
capital requirements, technological capacity, internal risk controls, 
appropriate management, etc)  
d. Formal rules or arrangements are in place to allow the RTGS operator to exclude a system participant in a timely fashion 
 
Scoring 
 
If all of the above, or all except b) 4
If all of the above exept c) or d) 3
If answers a) and c) 3
If answers a) and b) 2
If answers b) and d) or c) i d) 1
Otherwise 0
 
Finally, the system is more efficient and less risk exposed if there is explicit 
organizational part of system which can address all participants’ needs and solve 
problems connected with them.  
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SYSTEM GOVERNANCE 
8. Is there a specific RTGS User’s Group in place for the RTGS operator to 
better address participants’ needs? (indicate YES or NO) 
 
Scoring 
 
If YES, and score for this sub-component so far is 14 or 
more 
then give a 2 
If YES, and score for this sub-component is less than 14 then give a 1 
If NO, and score for this sub-component so far is 14 or 
more 
then give a 1 
If NO then give a 0 
 
After scoring, the level of LVPS development can be determined following the 
next scheme: 
 
Actual Score Level of Development 
>10-12 High
>7-10 Medium High 
>3-7 Medium Low 
0-3 Low
Notes: Maximum Score: 12 points; Minimum Score: 0 points. 
 
The structure of LVPS indicator implies that the risk management is key 
determinant of its development. The Q1 and Q2 have strongpoint in CP III - The 
system should have clearly defined procedures for the management of credit risks 
and liquidity risks, which specify the respective responsibilities of the system 
operator and the participants and which provide appropriate incentives to manage 
and contain those risks. The Q3 is directly connected to CP VII - The system 
should ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should 
have contingency arrangements for timely completion of daily processing. The 
Q4 is connected to CP VIII - The system should provide a means of making 
payments which is practical for its users and efficient for the economy, which is 
in broader sense connected with risk, as we already explained. Questions Q5 and 
Q6 have strongpoint in CPs IX and X – The system should have objective and 
publicly disclosed criteria for participation, which permit fair and open access; 
and The system’s governance arrangements should be effective, accountable and 
transparent. 
 
In the research part of this paper we did the calculation of the indicator with data 
obtained from WB countries (Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
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Macedonia, together with Slovenia), responses to the Global Payment System 
Survey carried by the PSDG (2008) in 2007 and 2008. The Survey data was not 
complete, because Montenegro did not send the fulfil Questionnaire. We provide 
essential answers with direct support from Central bank of Montenegro, National 
Payment Operations Department for 2010. In order to achieve the same time 
frame in the Questionnaire, we provide additional answers for other WB 
countries, in cooperation with their central banks.   
 
Cirasino and Garcia (2008) paper contain a table with all 142 examined countries, 
and their ranks. We used top down approach and reconstructed of all answers 
with scoring, in order to find the strength, weaknesses and risk exposure of the 
LVPS systems in WB countries and Slovenia. 
RESULTS 
On the basis of our data we constructed the following table. All WB countries and 
Slovenia are presented in the table, with individually results for each question. 
The table include the Sub row, because of the conditional scoring for Q. 6.1.  
 
  SRB HRV BIH MNE MKD SVN 
Liquidity risks  
1.1 3 3 3 1.5 3 1.5 
1.2 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
1.3 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 0 
Credit risks  
2.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Operational risks  
3.1 6 6 6 4 0 6 
Efficiency  
4.1 2 2 2 0 2 2 
Access rules and policies  
5.1 3 3 4 4 2 4 
Sub 17 17 18 12.5 10 15 
System governance  
6.1 1 1 2 0 1 2 
Score 18 18 20 12.5 11 17 
Rank 1 1 1 2 2 1 
 
The results points out that Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Slovenia 
have LVPS systems with High level of development, while Macedonia and 
Montenegro have systems with Medium High level of development.  
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The highest score in the region of WB countries has Bosnian RTGS, with 
maximum 20 points. This system (official name: RTGS) has the full protection of 
liquidity risk. As a liquidity extension the participants can use opening balances 
and funds received from other participants during the day and all their reserve 
requirements balance during the day. They also can use lines of credit between 
banks. RTGS operator allows current account overdraft and grants credit, either in 
form of loan or repo. The system has a queue for latter processing in case a 
participant does not have enough balance/credit in its current account to process 
payments. The RTGS operator use pricing policy to incentivize the smooth flow 
of payments through the system during the day. Because of ability to overdraft 
and take a credit, participants must provide high quality colateral. 
 
The operational risk is extremely well managed because RTGS has routine 
procedures for periodical data back-ups, tapes and another storage media which 
are kept in sites other then the main processing site and back-up servers which 
have been deployed at the main processing site. It also has a fully equipped 
alternate processing site and documented a formal business continuity plan. The 
business continuity arrangements include procedures for crisis management and 
information dissemination and those arrangements are regularly tested. From 
2011 in BiH there is a real-time interface between RTGS operator and Central 
Securities Depository (CSD). 
 
Serbia (official name: RTGS) and Croatia (official name: HSVP) have high 
developed LVSP, only 2 points below the highest possible level, exactly the same 
shortcoming. The systems enable opening balances and funds received from other 
participants during the day and RTGS operator allows current account overdrafts, 
as sources of liquidity. In Croatia participants can use a part of their reserve 
requirements during the day and in Serbia participants can use. In Croatia the 
RTGS operator allows current account overdrafts, and in Serbia the RTGS 
operator grants credit, either in form of loan or a repo. The both systems also have 
technical ability to enable queue for latter processing, in case when participant 
does not have enough balance/credit in its current account with RTGS operator. 
Finally, liquidity risk is minimized in these systems with pricing policy which 
incentivize the smooth flow of payments through the system during the day. 
Solutions for liquidity extension in Croatia and Serbia present the higher standard.  
According to methodology the credit risk exposure in the system is high if the 
RTGS operator allows overdrafts or loan without proper collateral. In these two 
counties the RTGS operator requires high quality collateral in all cases, and as a 
result of that, the credit risk is minimized.  
 
The operational risk in Croatian and Serbian payment system is also managed 
well, and received high score (see all about routines and continuity plan in BiH 
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part). The systems are efficient, because the RTGS operator have real-time 
interface with CSD.  
 
Small shortcoming in the systems can be found in the part of access and rules 
policies. The both systems have explicit access/exclusion policy. Also, access to 
the RTGS is granted on the basis of institutional standing (i.e. whether the appli-
cant is a bank or some other specific type of financial institution) and formal rules 
of arrangements are in place to allow the RTGS operator to exclude a system 
participant in a timely fashion. For maximum grade, the systems need to have 
access to the RTGS granted on the basis of the fulfilment of a set of objective 
criteria to ensure a safe and sound operation of the system (e.g. capital require-
ments, technological capacity, internal risk controls, appropriate management, 
etc.). 
 
Finally, both systems do not have a specific user group in place for the RTGS 
operator to better address participants’ needs, but they receive 1 point because the 
previous sub score is more than 14, so the efficiency and risk control are 
estimated as high, despite this deficiency. 
 
Slovenian payment system (official name: TARGET2-Slovenia) has only 1 point 
less than the previous. In this system the imperfection in liquidity risk can be 
found in lack of liquidity extension in form of overdraft. In this systems 
participant can use credit (either in form of loan or a repo), opening balances and 
funds received from other participants during the day and part of their reserve 
requirements during the day. The system has queue for latter processing in case 
when participant does not have enough balance/credit in its current RTGS 
account, but the operator do not use pricing policy to incentivize the smooth flow 
of payments through the system during the day. Credit risk is covered by high 
quality collateral3.  
 
The operational risk management is highly rated because Slovenian LVPS has all 
requested elements (see Croatia and Serbia). Efficiency in the system is high, 
because of existence a real-time interface between CSD and RTGS operator. 
Access rules and policies are according with the highest standard. there is an 
explicit access/exclusion policy for the RTGS system, access to the RTGS is 
granted on the basis of institutional standing (i.e. whether the applicant is a bank, 
or some other specific type of financial institution), access to the RTGS is also 
granted on the basis of the fulfilment of a set of objective criteria to ensure a safe 
                                                   
3 In the new methodology (2010) this answer is slightly changed, so the precise expression 
is suitable collateral. The explanation is: “In this context, suitable collateral should be 
interpreted as being liquid should a default occur. It also implies that the value of such 
collateral is marked to market on a daily basis and haircuts applied where appropriate.“ 
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and sound operation of the system (e.g. capital requirements, technological 
capacity, internal risk controls, appropriate management, etc) and formal rules or 
arrangements are in place to allow the RTGS operator to exclude a system 
participant in a timely fashion. All these conditions for participants provide the 
best score for Slovenia. The final question has also maximum score because the 
Slovenian central bank has specific RTGS Users’ Group in place to better address 
participants’ needs. 
 
Montenegro has LVPS (official name: RTGS) with medium high level of 
development (12.5/20). The liquidity extension is based on opening balances and 
funds received from the participants during the day and participant can use a part 
of their reserve requirements during the day. The better solution requires lines of 
credit between banks, the ability of RTGS operator to allow current account 
overdrafts or to grant a credit (either in form of loan or a repo). The system has 
queue for latter processing in case when participant does not have enough 
balance/credit in its current RTGS account, and the RTGS operator use pricing 
policy to incentivize the smooth flow of payments through the system during the 
day. Because of inability to grant a credit or overdraft there is no credit risk in the 
system. 
 
Montenegrin payment system has the most required procedure for system 
recovery. The only shortage is lack of procedures for crisis management and 
information dissemination in business plan. The problem also exists in the area of 
efficiency, because there is no real-time interface between CSD and RTGS 
operator.  
 
Access and policy rules are fully improved and consist of high standard 
requirements (see Slovenia). The additional shortage is absence of specific RTGS 
Users’ Group in place to better address participants’ needs. 
 
In WB region Macedonia has the lowest score for LVPS development (11/20), but 
its RTGS system (official name: MIPS) is in middle high category. Macedonian 
payment system has high scored liquidity management procedures, because 
participants can use opening balances and funds received from other participants 
during the day or all their reserve requirements balance during the day and RTGS 
operator grants credit, either in the form of a loan or repo. This is optimal 
combination of liquidity extension. The system also has technical ability to enable 
queue for latter processing, in case when participant does not have enough 
balance/credit in its current account with RTGS operator. Finally, liquidity risk is 
minimized in the systems with pricing policy which incentivize the smooth flow 
of payments through the system during the day. As a solution for credit risk 
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exposure in case when RTGS operator grants credits, system requires collateral of 
high quality. 
 
The main problem in Macedonian LVPS is operational risks. The system has only 
routine procedures in place for periodical data back-ups and back-up servers have 
been deployed at the main processing site. This part of LVPS indicator receives 0 
points. The operator (Macedonian central bank) need to implement tapes and 
another storage media which are kept in sites other then the main processing site, 
fully equipped alternate processing site and documented a formal business 
continuity plan. The business continuity arrangements have to include procedures 
for crisis management and information dissemination and those arrangements are 
regularly tested. The operational risks management is the reason for low scoring 
of Macedonian payment system.  
 
There is a real-time interface between RTGS operator and CSD. Lower score is 
caused also by the state of access and rules policies. The Macedonia has access to 
the RTGS is granted on the basis of institutional standing (i.e. whether 
the applicant is a bank, or some other specific type of financial institution) and 
formal rules or arrangements to allow the RTGS operator to exclude 
a system participant in a timely fashion. The highest score would be received if 
the system has explicit access/exclusion policy and access to the RTGS is granted 
on the basis of the fulfilment of a set of objective criteria to ensure a safe and 
sound operation of the system (e.g. capital requirements, technological capacity, 
internal risk controls, appropriate management, etc). Finally, there is a specific 
RTGS Users’ Group in place to better address participants’ needs. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In conclusion we can emphasize two points. First point is related to the structure 
of LVPS indicator. After insight of its consisting component we can conclude that 
the main part of it is measuring of liquidity, credit and operational risks in one 
word – systemic risks, together with efficiency. It is obvious that the systemic risk 
management is the essential part of large value payment system development.  
 
The other point is related to the research done in the WB countries and Slovenia. 
The results show that the systemic risk management is a high-level, so their 
national payment systems have good scores and belong to high or medium high 
developed systems. This is very important conclusion for WB countries in their 
efforts in EU integrations. Our recommendations for those countries are to 
improve their systems and avoid unnecessary risk exposure.  
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